Senator, thank you very much. I appreciate the invitation.

I am very glad to be here.

The Serbian crackdown in Kosovo presents the United States

with a Bosnia-like situation. Remain on the sidelines and watch

ethnic cleansing unfold, or muster the political will to intervene

early and forcefully to prevent escalation, genocide, and spillover to

neighboring States that will destroy NATO’s credibility and upset

the Dayton Peace Accords.

The level of political courage in Washington will determine the

level of slaughter in the Balkans. Serbian strong man Slobodan

Milosevic’s troops have been attacking villages since late February

in defiance of the Christmas warning. The credibility of the Christmas

warning conveyed to Milosevic from President Bush in December

1992 and renewed in 1993 by then-Secretary of State Warren

Christopher on behalf of the Clinton administration has eroded.

That very specific threat of force helped keep the peace in Kosovo

for over 5 years, but Milosevic in February crossed the line that

Bush and Clinton had drawn with impunity, if not with our blessing.

A resolute U.S. policy has given a de facto green light that

Milosevic has exploited with predictable effectiveness. The only

thing that will stop him now is a credible threat of force by the

President of the United States.

Could President Clinton mobilize Congress, the American public,

and the allies to support a tough conflict prevention strategy in

Kosovo? Milosevic is betting that the President will not try and has

calculated that in any case he would not succeed. Once again, Serbia

confronts Washington with a defining moment in the Balkans.

At stake is the belief in American power, purpose, and resolve to

deal with the toughest postwar security problems in Europe, preventing

genocidal conflict and spillover of local disputes into broader

regional war, sustaining the credibility of NATO, and ensuring

the continued implementation of the Dayton peace agreement in Bosnia.

Clinton blamed Bush for inheriting Bosnia. You cannot blame

Bush for Kosovo. Clinton administration officials conveniently suggested

during the Bosnia conflict that crises are best nipped in the

bud. In Kosovo, this is the bud. Confronting a population ratio of

9 to 1 in the Kosovar Albanians’ favor, Milosevic has only two

choices for altering the balance: Ethnic cleansing, and/or partition.

The intensity of the conflict is escalating rapidly. Small-scale ethnic

cleansing, begun on President Bill Clinton’s watch, also threatens

to expand in the coming weeks. We will not have long to wait

to determine whether nip-in-the-bud represents policy conviction or

the basis for a new genocide apology.

The administration’s crisis approach represents four points of a

political compass, rhetoric, economic sanctions, diplomacy, and

wishful thinking. Navigating with this compass will steer the U.S.

toward inevitable military involvement in a Balkan-wide conflict

after it becomes too late to prevent conflict, and when our forces

will have to shoot their way in rather than deploy peacefully.

The consequences of a policy whose purpose is the avoidance of

risk, engagement, and responsibility, rather than the deterrence of

war, will be significantly greater risks, violent engagements, and

burdensome responsibilities for resolving Kosovo, repairing NATO,

and resuscitating Dayton.

A forceful strategy, as outlined in the following proposals, will be

needed to prevent conflict in Kosovo. The administration should:

First, renew the Christmas warning threatening Milosevic with

military intervention if he continues to crack down in Kosovo.

Second, restore the credibility of the Christmas warning by disbanding

the ineffective Contact Group and shifting the venue for

U.S. leadership and actio to NATO. NATO engagement is critical.

Third, establish a NATO no-fly zone over Kosovo as an immediate

down-payment on a conflict prevention strategy.

Fourth, deploy a NATO observer mission to Kosovo. This will relieve

tensions there, undercut growing support for the Kosovo Liberation

Army, and provide justification for Kosovo Albanians to engage

in serious negotiations with Belgrade.

Fifth, link the NATO observer mission to NATO mandates to

take over the U.N. preventive deployment force in Macedonia and

establish a similar force in Albania.

Sixth, request that the War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague send

the prosecutor immediately to Kosovo and Belgrade to stress that

the tribunal will hold Serbian officials, beginning this time at the

top, accountable for crimes against humanity committed in Kosovo.

To show we mean business, NATO should apprehend indicted

Bosnian Serb war criminal Radovan Karadzic immediately. The

U.S. should also publicly call upon the tribunal to begin preparing

an indictment of Milosevic for crimes against humanity in Bosnia.

Seventh, appoint a special envoy of recognized public stature

with responsibility only for Kosovo. This will reduce Milosevic’s incentive

to trade off cooperation in Bosnia for freedom of action in

Kosovo and will give our diplomacy more leverage.

Eighth, launch a major and sustained initiative to buildup Serbia’s

democratic forces, to establish democracy and civic society in

Serbia. The root cause of our problems in the Balkans is the U.S.

failure over the past decade to advance democracy in Serbia. It is

time to make clear to everyone that Milosevic is the troublemaker,

not the peacemaker of the Balkans, and so long as he is in power,

the U.S. will be forced to repeatedly confront him.

The conflict prevention proposals outlined above impose considerable

burdens on policymakers for ideas and implementation, the

Congress for support of the risks involved, and especially on the

President for leadership.

Better such risks and burdens in preventing conflict than dealing

with the consequences of an action and an American political debate over who lost NATO.

Thank you very much.

Senator, I think the only way to—there is a lot of

dissention now within NATO, and I think that is because the

United States, the Clinton administration has been unwilling to exercise

proper leadership on this issue.

What I think we are advocating, and what Congressman Dio-

Guardi is advocating, is conflict prevention, the kind of military

measures that are credible enough to prevent the kind of conflict

that will require even greater military measures, greater risk,

greater burdens, or the more disastrous consequence if we do not act.

I think some of them are, but I think it has to go

further. Certainly NATO has to be involved, and the only way to

involve the allies behind our leadership is to say that we are prepared

to act unilaterally. Once we do that we can be sure they will be with us.

I think these proposals are some, but we need to also get the tribunal

involved to ensure that serious markers are put down on war

crimes, and we need to ensure that there is a conflict prevention

force, a NATO observation mission in Kosovo itself so that it is not

just ringed around Serbia and then genocide could be allowed to

take place within it, but that it is prevented within Serbia as well, and Kosovo.

I think Milosevic has successfully tapped in to the

ultranationalist political tendencies in Russia and used these very

effectively to build support, because there is no good democratic

reason for Russia to support what he is doing. In fact, quite to the

contrary. It was against Yeltsin’s democratic instincts, and I think

it shows how effective Milosevic has been.

I certainly believe that the only way—that peace and stability in

the Balkans are not going to be safe and secure until there is democracy

in Belgrade. That is the key. That is the bottom line.

The only way you get there from here is by setting the ground

rules, which the U.S. would have to do a credible threat of force

to ensure that this does not get any worse, and then start working

back until we have the kind of Government there that will check

the kind of, I think virulent ultranationalism that we have seen in

Belgrade that produces what we have seen, not what we are seeing

in Kosovo and what we have already seen in Croatia and Bosnia.

Kosovo was implicit in what Milosevic did in Bosnia and Croatia.

We are now just seeing it become explicit.

Senator, I want to assure you that if I can speak

for Mr. Fox here with me I think you are looking at the two people

who were the most active.

This administration’s inaction, and when we were

still in the State Department——

You start off with autonomy and work through negotiations

to autonomy plus. I think there are a variety of solutions.

One might well be Kosovo becoming a third republic in the

Federation with an equal level, or equal to a Serbia and Montenegro.

I think that would be an acceptable outcome to the Kosovars. I believe that.

I think there are other outcomes that are possible as well. The

best single way to restore the loyalty of the Kosovar Albanians to

the Serbian State I believe is through democracy in Belgrade. If

you had that, our problems would be over, the kind of conflict prevention

we are talking about.

Senator, they were not looking last year, and I think that is——

Well, I would start with Vesna Pesic and Zoran Djindjic.

Now, I realize these are leaders of two of the democratic parties.

They are democrats. I am not talking about the kind of opposition

ultranationalists who tried to trump Milosevic from the other side,

but essentially we are going to have to start with people like that and buildup.

This is not going to be something that is going to be done in 3

weeks, or 3 months. I do not know how long it will take.

But we are not going to find that—we are not going to be able

to tap into that democratic energy which I think is there in Serbia

until we decide whether to we are prepared to look past Milosevic

and start working with these people.